The Libel Show at UVA Law Class of '67 (9/20/2026)

I am just remembering an event from my third year of law school (UVA class of ’67). This was the Libel Show, an annual tradition where the third year law students sort of mocked the law professors (all in good fun). I had a bit part, playing a giant in administrative law, Carl McFarland. (In my legal writing over the past few years, Carl McFarland has loomed large because he played the principal role in the  enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. (Just a tacky aside, the Supreme Court over the past few years have grossly misapplied the APA in ways that McFarland would not recognize; UVA has McFarland's Papers, including APA papers online here.) At any rate, back to the Libel Show.

The title of the 1967 Libel Show was: "Mountain Man Meets the 'Hardy' Boys" (The reference to Hardy Dillard, dean of the law school (a giant in the law). The following is a short blurb from the promo materials to whip up enthusiasm and attendance for the show:

The Libel Show this year is one big huge, rollicking "New Tort." The faculty is insulted, defamed, slandered, libeled in song and story.

Come see these invasions of privacy:

Bald Tommy Bergin and Micky Dickie Speidel's debating the admission of a bastard to U.Va., and

Charlie Gregory's sponsoring the admission of this bastard to U.Va.

Additional Attractions

___ Schotland squeaking
___ Many Munford girls molested
___ First year law girls molesting
___ Hardy Dillard leering
___ Em. Spies with new multiple choice questions.
___ Other jaws clamping shut on the 'gator'
___ Repeating Little Caesar McCoid repeating
___ Nancy Buc as 'Georgy Girl' *
___ Mary Voce as 'Baby Doll' *
___Tom Doud as Mason Willrich
___ And many other first year students.

My recollection is that Ms. Buc and Ms. Voce were 1st year law students, probably graduating in 1969. I'm not sure about Tom Doud. I am not sure why they were mentioned in the promo materials. Perhaps to get a draw from 1st year students who might otherwise have skipped the 3rd year foolishness in the Libel Show. In my class of '67, we had 5 women who started with us (about 250 total), and as I recall three graduated with us. (Aside, those women were very smart and accomplished.)

The pretense of the 1967 Libel show was a country bumpkin named Homer from Louisiana stumbling his way through a UVA bachelor’s degree and then law degree. (I stumbled my way through UVA law after stumbling through USC (the real one in Columbia, SC)). The Libel Show had lots of “in jokes” that only people affiliated with the law school would recognize. Since I was there at the time, I appreciated the jokes.

Textualism or Pragmatism in Torah Study (8/29/26)

I have recently published an article in which a central theme is ambiguity in statutory text. See Townsend ABA Tax Lawyer Article Titled Loper Bright Flip Flops on Chevron Deference: A Tax Lawyer's Perspective (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 8/28/26), here. In this morning’s Torah Study focusing on Deuteronomy 26:1-1:19, Sefaria here, many interesting points were discussed. However, in my mind I veered off into the following question: In Torah interpretation, should the interpreter consider the consequences if the interpretation prevails? (Readers of this blog entry should not spend any time trying to figure out how I got to the question from the Torah reading; it's complex.)

I am a lawyer and this issue plays out in legal interpretation as well. At the expense of lack of nuance in a very complicated subject (statutory or constitutional interpretation), the issue plays out in the debate between so-called textualists (think fomer Justice Scalia and his current acolytes on the Supreme Court) and pragmatists (think retired Justice Breyer and his acolytes on the Supreme Court*). Starkly (without nuance) framed, the issue for text that can have more than one interpretation is between (i) an interpretation of the constitutional or statutory text at the time it was enacted as some mythical reasonable person would have read it regardless of the current consequences of the interpretation (e.g., as a literate (able to read) person in 1789) and (ii) an interpretation that considers the current (2026) consequences of alternative interpretations.

A similar issue arises in Torah interpretation (and of course all Bible interpretation for Jews and for Christians). Stated another way, the issue is whether the reader can update the interpretation to make the interpretation work better in the current world we actually live in? So, in the context of Torah Study, I asked ChatGPT Plus (my current favored AI tool) the following prompt:

In Torah interpretation, should the interpreter consider the consequences if the interpretation prevails?

I link to the entire response here. Please note that I ask the opening prompt and then have an iterative prompt suggested by the ending of the first response.

The ChatGPT Plus conclusion is (after going through details and examples; bold face in original response):

Meaning in Torah (7/30/26)

I was captured by the introduction to this article which focuses on reading the Torah as the writer intended to write it. Dr.Michael Carasik, Reading the Bible Like a Writer (The Torah.com), here. I have recently posted on guides to interpreting meaning of text--what is more persuasive: the author's meaning or what the audience (contemporary or millenia later) might interpret the words to mean. See  James Kugel on the Shema; JAT on Originalism and Textualism (Jack Townsend Blog 7/24/26), here.

One of the examples the author uses to draw the naïve (like me) into the discussion is:

When Beethoven writes a chromatic accidental—adding a note, such as a C♯, to a key that does not include a C♯—it is not enough to point that out analytically. We need to be on the alert to discover the reason we are hearing that note—how it serves to modulate or add tension to the melodic line.

Caveat for those tempted to read the linked discussion, it delves into topics that perhaps a linguist will understand and enjoy. For example, under the heading Joseph and the Shechemite Speak (In)formally, the author says: 

When Jacob sends his son Joseph to check on the flocks that Joseph’s brothers are tending at Shechem, a man finds him along the way. The “man” (who is the focus of most of the traditional commentary on this verse)^[2] uses an imperfect verb form to ask Joseph מַה תְּבַקֵּשׁ (mah tevakesh)?

^{בראשׁית לז:טו}וַיִּמְצָאֵהוּ אִישׁ וְהִנֵּה תֹעֶה בַּשָּׂדֶה וַיִּשְׁאָלֵהוּ הָאִישׁ לֵאמֹר מַה תְּבַקֵּשׁ.

 ^{Gen 37:15} A man came upon him wandering in the fields. The man asked him, “What are you looking for (tevakesh)?”

What ChatGPT Plus Knows About Me as of 7/26/26 and updated 7/28/26 (7/26/26; 7/28/26)

Note: On 7/28/26, I updated the original ChatGPT Plus response by asking ChatGPT Plus to consider my blogs. I have added the new prompt and the response after the original prompt and response. I have not omitted or edited anything from the responses. Of course, I would not expect ChatGPT which is sort of on my retainer (monthly fees) to say bad things for fear that I would fire her (or is it a he or it). 😁

Today I was reading a New York Times article about asking AI about one's self. Brian X. Chen, 4 Prompts That Can Tell You What Chatbots Really Know About You (NYT 7/23/26). So, I used the first prompt from the article and asked about me. Here is the result:

Prompt (from the NYT article): Tell me everything you’ve figured out about me that I never actually stated — the things you inferred from how I write and what I ask, including my age, income level, where I live, my personal situation. Show me what tipped you off.

ChatGPT's Response:

Worked for 1m 1s

I can separate what you actually disclosed, what I reasonably infer, and what would be speculation. Some apparent “inferences” are facts you stated in earlier conversations.

Strong inferences

You are probably John A. “Jack” Townsend

Confidence: high, but not certain.

What tipped me off:

• Your profile identifies you as John Townsend.
• You asked for a list of articles by John A. Townsend, described as a tax lawyer and adjunct professor.
• You asked, “Is Jack Townsend a good tax controversy lawyer?” That sounded potentially self-referential.
• Your questions display unusually deep familiarity with federal tax practice, criminal tax doctrine, IRS procedures, and legal scholarship.

My working hypothesis is that you are—or are closely connected with—John A. “Jack” Townsend. I would not treat that identification as conclusively established solely from these clues.

You are an experienced lawyer, legal scholar, or both

Confidence: very high.

The strongest clues are not merely your subject matter, but the way you frame questions:

• You distinguish statutory text, elements, venue, materiality, burdens of proof, waiver, and continuing offenses.
• You ask for statutory and case authority rather than generic explanations.
• You request “law review style” treatment.
• You notice narrow interpretive problems such as whether “inquired of” in 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) extends beyond grand-jury investigations.
• You ask citation-format questions and test whether propositions have adequate authority.

That is not how a casual taxpayer or beginning law student ordinarily writes. You seem accustomed to developing arguments, identifying doctrinal gaps, and anticipating counterarguments.

Your specialty is probably federal tax controversy and criminal tax

Confidence: very high.

Your recent questions cluster around:

• I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7202, 7206(1), and 7206(2);
• venue in federal tax prosecutions;
• implied materiality requirements;
• IRS criminal and administrative investigations;
• OIRA review of tax regulations;
• IRS publications and implementation;
• tax-law articles and scholarship.

The specificity suggests professional specialization rather than a passing interest.

James Kugel on the Shema; JAT on Originalism and Textualism (7/24/26)

Professor Kugel offers here this nice historical perspective on Judaism’s prayer and central declaration of faith—the Shema which in Reform Judaism is here It is the claim that there is one God, our God—interpreted over the years (and traditions) as monotheism.

While I am not Jewish in a formal sense, I have absorbed the teachings of Reform Judaism after 25 years (and counting) of Torah Study every Saturday morning. Professor Kugel is one of my favorite authors, so I am fortunate to be on his email list for his weekly offerings that often help me in Torah Study.

This offering recounts how the bare words of the Torah were summarized in the Shema and were interpreted differently than the original words meant if read literally. As a lawyer who has considered the Supreme Court’s Constitutional and statutory interpretation over many years, Professor Kugel’s offering on the Shema meaning for me. If Judaism were limited to the text alone, there would be much in the Hebrew Bible (basically the same as the Christian Old Testament with some variances in content and translation) that would not be meaningful to us today. Alongside the written Hebrew Bible (for present purposes, the Torah, the First Five Books) was the Oral Torah about which I have written here. The Written Torah and the Oral Torah inform Judaism; and the Oral Torah can change the literal meaning of the text. In other words, the Oral Torah can shape meaning for the ongoing Torah. The Rabbis certainly did that in canonizing the Written Torah keeping the Oral Torah alive in and, in a sense, the process continues through the Talmud(s) and Midrash. It is too bad, I think, that Christianity has not absorded the teachings of that continuing process because it would dispel the false claim that the God of the Old Testament (Hebrew Bible) is a God of wrath rather than, as they claim is presented in the New Testament, a God of mercy.

Because I understand that all written text needs interpretation to be meaningful, I am unimpressed with the relatively recent conservative law project called “originalism” and, its cousin, textualism to read the Constitution and statutes (although many textualists claim that textualism is not literalism). My interest in these slogans derives from my federal tax controversy practice over most of my career. I am in the process of finalizing the 2026 editions of my Federal Tax Procedure book for publication on SSRN in early August. I devote a significant words, pages, and footnotes to aspects of statutory interpretation.

On Leviticus 13 and Biblical Interpretation Beyond Any Likely Original Meaning (4/25/26)

This morning in my Torah Study (via Zoom with Houston’s Congregation Beth Israel, we covered the Holiness Code in Leviticus 19. In Torah Study, we read the text and interpret the text to make the text meaningful in our lives. I am a lawyer with interests in constitutional and statutory interpretation to make the text meaningful to the community served by the Constitution and statutes; the process is the same, but our Torah Study community is curious about the “original meaning” of the Torah text, but we are far from wedded to whatever we believe the or an original interpretation might be. As Jim Kugel, probably my favorite Hebrew Bible Scholar, says: The text we honor is the interpreted text, including interpretation by the tradition of rabbis and by ourselves in our current community. I could write a lot on whether interpretation of the Hebrew Bible should be different from interpretation of Constitution or statutes, and do on my Federal Tax Procedure Blog, here.

In this post, I want to focus on Leviticus 19:13. Since all translation is interpretation, we find it helpful to use two principal texts: Plaut’s The Torah: A Modern Commentary (Revised Edition 2006) in hardcopy (although I also have it in Kindle) and Sefaria’s online resource, here, which is really quite good. Often someone will bring in Robert Alter’s magnificent translation/interpretation in his book on the Torah, The Five Books of Moses: A Translation with Commentary (2004). Just for fun, I offer the three translations with commentary.

Plaut translation:

13] You shall not  defraud your fellow [Israelite]. You shall not commit robbery.

The Plaut translation offers no commentary other than supplying the bracketed word.

Sefaria Translation 

13 You shall not defraud your fellow.^a You shall not commit robbery.

The only “commentary” in Sefaria is in the subscripted text adding: fellow I.e., fellow Israelite—whether male or female. In contrast to others “neighbor.”

 Alter translation

13 You shall not defraud your fellow man and shall not rob.

 Alter has no comment on this text.

In this morning's session, we read from the Plaut edition, the reading included the bracketed [Israelite] that, if a proper interpretation, is a commandment not to defraud fellow Israelites.

On Dave the Potter, a Literate Slave in Edgefield SC, and Anti-Literacy Laws (3/25/26)

Persons interested in the history of Greenwood SC probably already know that “Greenwood County was formed in 1897 from portions of Abbeville and Edgefield counties,” Wikipedia, here. This segues into today’s post on Dave the Potter inspired by Their Ancestor Was an Enslaved Potter. They Are Battling to Recover His Legacy (New York Times 3/25/26), here gift article. The featured artist in the article is Dave the Potter who was a slave in Edgefield County SC and a respected potter whose works are now in the 21^st Century gathering more attention. See e.g., this YouTube video titled Hear Us Now: Poets Respond to Hear Me Now: The Black Potters of Old Edgefield, South Carolina, here. Dave the Potter was inducted in the South Carolina Hall of Fame. See e.g., YouTube video titled Dave the Potter | South Carolina Hall of Fame, here.

As an aside, Gemini (Google’s AI Tool) says that Dave the Potter did not live and create his pottery in the portion of Edgefield SC split off into Greenwood SC.

One interesting fact is that Dave the Potter could read and write at a time when it was a crime to teach slaves to read and write. I asked Gemini (Google’s AI Tool) “Why did some southern states prohibit teaching slaves to read and write?” The response Gemini offered was: